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THE DISABILITY–EMPLOYABILITY DIVIDE:
BOTTLENECKS TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
Bradley A. Areheart*
Michael Ashley Stein*
Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity. By Joseph
Fishkin. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. 1,
257. $35.
Introduction
Equal opportunity might appear to comprise a relatively simple ques-
tion: Do similarly situated persons have an equal chance to attain a particu-
lar goal, or do obstacles irrelevant to their qualifications or to the desired
goal preclude achievement? But equal opportunity is complicated.1 There are
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions to this question. Nuances exist when
determining who is similarly situated, whether those individuals have the
same opportunity, what goals we care about equalizing, and whether the
ultimate aspiration is equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. More-
over, what means should we employ to remove obstacles, are these means
likely to be successful, and do the cultural means justify the societal ends?
And some readily apparent factors leading to inequalities of opportunity
seem inexorable, including our individual genetic makeup, the environments
in which we are raised, and our overall social circumstances. These consider-
ations have prompted some scholars to argue that equality of opportunity is
possible only if both law and government are committed to achieving it.2
To discuss equal opportunity in a coherent way often requires focusing
on specific domains.3 One field in which equal opportunity has special
resonance is employment. Societal support exists both for the descriptive
idea that racial discrimination poses an obstacle to equal opportunity and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
** Executive Director, Harvard Law School Project on Disability, and Visiting Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
1. See, e.g., James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family 132
(1983) (arguing that equal opportunity principles produce a fundamental conflict between
liberty and equality once we account for the role of the family in preparing children to take
advantage of opportunities); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A
Jurisprudential Approach, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1687, 1689 (1986) (“A coherent and comprehen-
sive concept of equal opportunity must rely on a theory of substantive equality.”).
2. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest &
Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 Ind. L.J. 763, 777 (2011).
3. “Otherwise,” asks Fishkin, “where would we begin?” It would be impossible, and not
necessarily desirable, to equalize all opportunities for all people all of the time. P. 4.
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for the prescriptive idea that such an obstacle ought to be overcome. Accord-
ingly, a law like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 conveys something
specific about what opportunities are important (work), what obstacles are
inappropriate (discrimination), and what type of equality of opportunity is
desired (race, color, sex, religion, and national origin). Such antidiscrimina-
tion laws generally enjoy strong support in the United States.4
Joseph Fishkin’s new book, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportu-
nity,5 reinvigorates the concept of equal opportunity by simultaneously en-
gaging with its complications and attempting to simplify its ambitions.
Fishkin describes bottlenecks as narrow spaces in the opportunity structure
through which people must pass if they hope to reach a range of opportuni-
ties on the other side (p. 13). A significant component of the American
opportunity structure that Bottlenecks leaves largely unexplored, however,
relates to people with disabilities.6 This Review applies Fishkin’s theory to
explore how disability law creates and perpetuates bottlenecks that keep peo-
ple with disabilities from achieving a greater degree of human flourishing. In
particular, disability policy’s opportunity structure features a conceptual dis-
ability–employability divide that ultimately prevents people with disabilities
from reaching a wider array of opportunities. Fishkin’s book, in concert
with this Review, introduces new and inventive ways of reimagining and
implementing structural solutions to these bottlenecks.
Part I provides an overview of Fishkin’s arguments, including his theory
of opportunity pluralism, which he advances as a theoretical framework for
broadening the opportunity structure. Part II then applies Fishkin’s theory
to administrative disability policy to address and evaluate the disabil-
ity–employability divide as a bottleneck. In particular, this Part explores how
people with disabilities are frequently unable to pass through certain bottle-
neck policies to reach productive employment on the other side. Part III
then proffers several policy solutions that could enable people with disabili-
ties to move through or around the bottlenecks that keep them from acces-
sing productive work opportunities.
I. Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity
Bottlenecks endeavors to demystify the concept of equal opportunity
through the relatively simple metaphor of a bottleneck. Fishkin defines “bot-
tlenecks” as narrow spaces through which people must pass to reach greater
opportunities (p. 13). He characterizes bottlenecks as inevitable obstacles (p.
156) that ought to be addressed if they become pervasive or severe
(pp. 21–22). To illustrate, Bottlenecks relates how some state legislatures have
enacted laws in recent years to ban credit checks in hiring, bar employers
4. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 1 (1999)
(discussing Americans’ belief in equal opportunity).
5. Joseph Fishkin is an Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
6. The book ably demonstrates how discrimination creates bottlenecks, pp. 20–21,
110–11, but there are only a few references to disability or reasonable accommodations.
Pp. 22, 105–06, 168–69, 252.
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from indicating “no unemployed need apply,” or prevent employers from
inquiring into previous criminal convictions (pp. 21, 231–35). Fishkin ar-
gues that extending these innovative and seemingly unconventional protec-
tions is actually a part of our conventional antidiscrimination heritage. In
other words, antidiscrimination law is, and should be, fundamentally about
ameliorating severe bottlenecks in the structure of opportunity—and these
recent statutes and doctrines are designed to do just that (pp. 20–22, 235).
Fishkin labels his proposal “opportunity pluralism,” which “requires us
to look in a more structural way at how the opportunities in our society are
created, distributed, and controlled” (pp. 1, 16–18). He wants to transcend a
“big test society” (p. 15) in which there are strikingly similar preferences for
jobs, social roles, or instrumental goods—and in which successes snowball,
as “each outcome is another opportunity.”7 To do so, we need a pluralistic
model of opportunities in which no bottleneck is too severe and many dif-
ferent processes and paths enable one to pursue success (pp. 15–17, 76). If
there is a highway of opportunities, Fishkin desires as many on-ramps as
possible (p. 17). That way, if you fail to clear a big test hurdle at age sixteen,
there remain other chances to pursue valuable opportunities.8 Expanding the
means for achievement may, over time, turn the conventional opportunity
structure, which currently resembles a pyramid, into something that looks
“more like a city, with many different structures and various roads and
paths” to success.9 But expanding the number of on-ramps or paths to op-
portunities requires, among other things, first minimizing or undoing the
effects created by certain bottlenecks (pp. 18–20).
Importantly, some bottlenecks are warranted (pp. 160–63, 169). In cer-
tain circumstances, we perhaps want a fairly unitary and rigid structure for
specific opportunities. For example, we might decide that the route to be-
coming a pediatric anesthesiologist ought to be a very narrow one, given the
specific set of skills required for and the stakes associated with that line of
work. Hence, we might favor retaining the current bottleneck (which de-
pends largely on the standardized United States Medical Licensing Examina-
tion) to ensure that only extremely qualified people can hold such jobs. The
efficiency costs in designing alternative routes to such a specialized position
may likewise counsel in favor of retaining the test and its consequent
bottleneck.10
Fishkin advises us to ask two questions to determine whether we ought
to retain a particular bottleneck. First, we must decide whether the policy
creating the bottleneck is legitimate or arbitrary (p. 160). Here, we are con-
cerned with the strength of the justification for imposing a bottleneck.
7. P. 70 (quoting Clare Chambers, Each Outcome Is Another Opportunity: Problems with
the Moment of Equal Opportunity, 8 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 374 (2009)).
8. See generally pp. 66–70.
9. Pp. 17–18; see also David Miller, Principles of Social Justice 200 (1999) (op-
posing a “single-pyramid” conception of merit).
10. See p. 179 (observing that efficiency costs must be balanced against the value of
opportunity pluralism).
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Fishkin illustrates this idea with the credential of credit scores (p. 162). Con-
ditioning a person’s ability to get a loan on that person’s credit score might
seem a legitimate practice, given the lender’s natural and logical interest in
ensuring that the person has the capacity to pay back loans in a timely man-
ner (p. 162). Conditioning a person’s ability to get a job on that person’s
credit score seems arbitrary, however, given that credit scores are poor
predictors of whether a person will be a good employee (p. 162). Even if
using a credential or requirement is legitimate, we may decide that other
values warrant limiting its use as a prerequisite. For example, even assuming
that a four-year college degree was legitimate for every job as an indicator of
a given individual’s capabilities, we might oppose requiring such a degree for
every job given the countervailing value of opportunity pluralism.11
The second question is whether the bottlenecking effect of a policy or
requirement is severe. Even if a policy is arbitrary or unjustified, it still may
not present much of a problem for making certain opportunities widely
available (p. 163). Here, we are concerned with both the pervasiveness and
strictness of any particular bottleneck (pp. 164–70). For pervasiveness, we
want to know how many paths to opportunity are actually constrained by
this requirement (p. 164). For strictness, we want to know whether the pol-
icy is “an absolute bar, a strong preference, or just a mild preference”
(p. 164). Applying these concepts to the example of credit scores, we want to
know how many employers actually require credit scores as a component of
their application (pervasiveness) and whether this information is being ap-
plied strictly or just as part of an overall query into an applicant’s reliability
(strictness). Some bottlenecks may be pervasive but not especially strict,
such as employers’ valuing attractiveness (p. 164). Alternatively, some bot-
tlenecks might be strict but not especially pervasive, such as employers’ re-
fusing to hire employees with children.
If a requirement is both arbitrary and severe, the case for ameliorating
that bottleneck is “particularly compelling” (p. 167). In these instances,
Fishkin contends that the bottleneck should be addressed by helping people
get through—or around—it (pp. 19, 171–72). This way of examining op-
portunities provides a novel filter through which to reexamine antidis-
crimination law. American antidiscrimination law tends to focus on
wrongdoing by asking questions like the following: Why did the employer
make a particular decision, that is, was there “disparate treatment” under
the relevant statute? Is an employer-imposed requirement a business neces-
sity, or is there a less discriminatory alternative?12 Note that these questions
11. See p. 163 (observing that, even if a “big test” were a legitimate predictor for every
job, “that does not mean that adopting it across the board is ultimately the best policy, once
we account for the value of opportunity pluralism”). This would be similar to the thrust of
disparate impact jurisprudence under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Supreme Court decided that requiring a high-
school diploma was a discriminatory practice that was not justified by reference to the under-
lying jobs. The exclusionary effects were simply not worth the value of the proxy. See p. 165
(discussing Griggs).
12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012).
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do not demand that the wrongdoing was severe or pervasive. According to
Fishkin, these priorities are backwards; we ought to worry less about motive
and more about whether certain bottlenecks severely constrain opportuni-
ties (p. 231).
Along the way, Fishkin explicates a taxonomy of bottlenecks. The most
familiar are qualification bottlenecks in which opportunities are constrained
by some requirement (p. 156). A qualification bottleneck could involve a
requirement that the applicant possess a diploma or degree, succeed on a
certain test, or be a member of a particular race or sex.13 There are also
developmental bottlenecks, in which opportunities are limited by the failure
to develop important abilities or skills (pp. 156–58). These bottlenecks are
often tied to status and implicate race, class, and/or disability. Education in
general, and literacy in particular, is perhaps the most basic example: oppor-
tunities will be constrained for those who cannot read or write well (pp. 14,
156–58). Finally, there are instrumental-good bottlenecks, in which oppor-
tunities are controlled by a limited instrumental good that everyone wants
(pp. 158–59). As an example, money may become a bottleneck where it is
instrumentally necessary to reach outcomes that people value but where eve-
ryone cannot obtain the amount of money they need to reach those out-
comes (pp. 158–60).
Part of Fishkin’s motivation in advocating for greater opportunity plu-
ralism is his philosophical orientation that there is “no such thing as ‘natu-
ral’ talent or effort, unmediated by the opportunities the world has afforded
us, which include our circumstances of birth.”14 While it is tempting to view
outcomes as part nature, part nurture, Fishkin says that all behavioral out-
comes are 100% nature and 100% nurture (p. 95). Neither is a sufficient
causal mechanism; neither does any work by itself.15 Thus, for genes to do
anything, they must be activated or “expressed,” which often depends on a
person’s environment.16 A particular environment similarly influences ge-
netic activity, traits, capacities, merit, and the social and job-based roles that
a person holds—and these in turn all reimpact a person’s environment.17 So
13. See p. 156 (“The question is what is actually required to pursue a path, not what is
required officially or on paper.”).
14. P. 83. He devotes an entire chapter to explicating this viewpoint. Pp. 83–129.
15. Fishkin offers the following illustration: the conventional understanding of na-
ture–nurture is that each contributes to the person separately, in the way that two people, say
Billy and Suzy, might each partly fill a bucket with water. One might ask about Billy’s and
Suzy’s contributions to the bucket of water, and the answer might be that Billy is 60% respon-
sible while Sally provided 40% of the water. Fishkin contends that natural and environmental
forces, rightly understood, are much more synergistic, and he offers a revised picture: Suzy
brings the hose and Billy turns on the water. Now it makes little sense to ask how much of the
filled bucket is due to Billy and Suzy, respectively. The bucket of water is due 100% to both of
their unique and complementary contributions. Pp. 95–96.
16. P. 94. Similarly, environmental conditions may trigger hormone production, which
in turn triggers gene expression. P. 94.
17. P. 114. Fishkin includes a graphic figure that very helpfully illustrates this iterative
process.
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when we question why or how someone becomes well qualified for a partic-
ular job, the answer is that there has been a multistaged, “iterative process of
interaction between a person and her environment” (p. 104).
Fishkin keenly observes that opportunities matter not just because they
are instrumental in attaining a certain outcome, such as well-paying employ-
ment, but also because they facilitate agency by providing access to intangi-
ble goods (pp. 9–10). Opportunities give us the materials out of which we
build our lives (p. 10). They give us the chance to make choices and thus aid
in the formation of self, including the development of human capital.18 In
the employment context, the opportunity to work matters not simply be-
cause it provides a means to earn an income but because it is embedded
with a plethora of social meanings and social goods.19 This reality has led
scholars to write about the dignitary value in work and to argue that em-
ployment is about “pride, dignity, and belonging—the societal standing that
comes from providing for one’s family and contributing to one’s
community.”20
II. Disability-Specific Bottlenecks
There are a few bottlenecks that repeatedly keep people with disabilities
from enjoying the full range of opportunities. The first is the most plainly
literal of bottlenecks—accessibility. If a group of people cannot access a
workplace or public accommodation, inaccessibility poses an obstacle to fur-
ther opportunities (pp. 22, 252). Discrimination creates a second bottleneck.
When a person needs a particular identity to pursue certain paths, this de
facto requirement narrows a route in the opportunity structure (pp. 20–21,
110–11). Fishkin briefly mentions these two bottlenecks, which represent
relatively straightforward applications of his theory.
This Part applies Fishkin’s theory to illuminate and explore one equally
critical, but less intuitive, bottleneck: the law’s binary structure of disability
and employability. This basic idea—although empirically incorrect and so-
cially harmful—derives from the history of disability and modern adminis-
trative law, as well as from the very semantics of the word “disability.” In a
classic tautology, if you are disabled, you must not be able to work; in con-
trast, if you are able to work, you must not really be disabled. This binary
18. P. 10. Fishkin succinctly illustrates this point by sketching the story of two people
with similar socioeconomic backgrounds. One attends an American university, which results
in a range of potential careers and choices, and the other is strongly urged by his family to join
the family business. Over a lifetime, both have, by all accounts, equally successful lives. But by
Fishkin’s account, they do not enjoy equal opportunities. And the opportunity to choose from
a broad range of choices matters in part because choosing is a dignitary good. Pp. 9–10.
19. See Jody Heymann, Michael Ashley Stein & Gonzalo Moreno, Disability, Employ-
ment, and Inclusion Worldwide, in Disability and Equity at Work 1–3 (Jody Heymann,
Michael Ashley Stein & Gonzalo Moreno eds., 2014).
20. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. Rev.
1161, 1168 (2008).
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system serves to encourage people either to work or receive benefits. Fur-
thermore, once a person works or receives benefits, it is difficult and compli-
cated to cross from one path over to the other. This Part will thus consider
how the legal manifestations of the disability–employability bottleneck con-
strain certain opportunities.
Treating disability and employability as binary conditions has been a
long-standing administrative mechanism justifying the distribution of
money or other goods to those unable to work.21 Indeed, the artificial either/
or construct reaches back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws,22 which themselves
grew out of fourteenth-century edicts intended to regulate vagrancy.23 Such
distributive schemes have long sought to sort the population into two
groups: those who are able and expected to work and those who are not able
to work and thus eligible for public assistance. Historically, people with disa-
bilities have been viewed as falling squarely within the latter group.24
Contemporary administrative law incorporates this binary system and
perpetuates it by forcing people into a dichotomous choice between working
or receiving benefits. More often than not, the system shunts people with
disabilities onto the benefits track. And transitioning from receiving benefits
to working for a living, or vice versa, is fraught with peril under the current
system. This is problematic from the viewpoint of opportunity pluralism
because the resulting structure sharply limits the opportunity paths open to
people with disabilities. This Part will now examine a few of the structural
manifestations of this administrative bottleneck.
Welfare is one incarnation of this bottleneck. Welfare is a well-inten-
tioned program that aspires to help people transition between benefits and
work. And yet state-run, disability-oriented rehabilitation and vocational
training programs fall short of this goal because they are insufficient for the
task. This is partly due to their “work-first” emphasis, which often comes at
the expense of greater emphasis on training or educational programs.25 The
21. Disability has long been an administrative category in the welfare state, a status that
exempts a person from the labor market. See Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State 4–10
(1984).
22. See generally Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of
Welfare, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 809, 809–10, 821–22 (1966).
23. Stone, supra note 21, at 29; see id. at 29–40 (describing the evolution from four-
teenth-century regulation of vagrants to the regulations of Poor Law administration). The
English Poor Laws set up a system of economic distribution from the labor market to those
unable to participate in that market. Id. at 51–55. Of the five categories of people considered
paupers by Poor Law administrators, four—the sick, the insane, “defectives,” and the “aged
and infirm”—“are part of today’s concept of disability.” Id. at 40. Disability thus originated as
a status that was defined by whether a person was able to work. Id. at 54–55.
24. Of course, disability has not always been a single administrative category of the wel-
fare state; in early descriptions of welfare programs in Europe, people with disabilities were
subsumed under categories like “aged and infirm,” “lunatics and defectives,” and “invalids and
the lying-in.” Id. at 26.
25. See generally Martha F. Davis, Learning to Work: A Functional Approach to Welfare
and Higher Education, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 147 (2010) (arguing that welfare law is ineffective due
to a lack of emphasis on education and training); Janice Y. Law, Comment, Changing Welfare
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result is that welfare recipients who start out lacking the education or train-
ing necessary to compete successfully in the labor market remain so and will
naturally face limited prospects for career progression.26 Concurrently, while
states have progressively scaled back funding for welfare benefits,27 in recent
years the federal government has increased spending for disability cash-
transfer programs.28 This dynamic is reflected in the current industry of pro-
fessionals commissioned by states to help transfer people from state-sup-
ported welfare to federally funded disability benefits.29 Welfare-to-work has
become welfare-to-disability.
Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) also perpetuate the disability–employability bottleneck. Both
federal administrative programs are administered by the Social Security Ad-
ministration (“SSA”) and provide income support for disabled individuals
who are unable to work.30 The criteria for the programs differ. SSDI is disa-
bility and work based—that is, a person must both have a disability and
have worked enough to qualify.31 In contrast, SSI is strictly need based and
does not rely on a history of work.32 Both programs disincentivize work, but
in different ways. Under SSDI, employees are induced to quit their jobs im-
mediately after the onset of a work-limiting disability since it is impossible
under the law for them to obtain assistance from SSDI without first leaving
the labor force.33 No benefits may be paid for at least five months, although
“As We Know It” One More Time: Assuring Basic Skills and Postsecondary Education Access for
TANF Recipients, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 243 (2008) (same).
26. Law, supra note 25, at 243–44.
27. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2613–14
(2005) (observing that state funding has decreased since the 1990s due to recessions but has
never been revamped during periods of prosperity).
28. See Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in U.S. Disability
System, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 2011, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046. Part of this expansion is due to the fact
that “in 2004 the [Social Security Administration] and Congress relaxed rules governing repre-
sentation, making it easier for nonlawyer advocates to get paid.” Id.
29. Chana Joffe-Walt, Moving People From Welfare To Disability Rolls Is A Profitable, Full-
Time Job, NPR (Mar. 27, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/175502085/moving-
people-from-welfare-to-disability-rolls-is-a-profitable-full-time-job (chronicling the phenom-
enon in which state governments hire consulting groups to move people off of state-supported
welfare and onto federally funded disability).
30. Substantial Gainful Activity, Soc. Sec. Admin., www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“To be eligible for disability benefits, a person must be unable to engage
in substantial gainful activity (SGA).”).
31. Disability Planner, Soc. Sec. Admin., http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/dqualify.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2014).
32. Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Eligibility Requirements, Soc. Sec.
Admin., http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-eligibility-ussi.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
33. Workers who participate in gainful employment during the application period are
automatically denied benefits. David Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the
United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options 10 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 12-01, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987244.
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a successful application process often takes several years.34 Once workers
with impairments have stopped working and begun receiving benefits, it
often becomes difficult—due to gaps in their work history, the investment
of time and often legal fees in obtaining SSDI benefits, or inertia—for them
to reenter the workforce.35 Indeed, one study shows that individuals who are
out of work for six months due to a work-related injury or illness have only
a 50% chance of returning to work, and that number drops to 25% and 2%
at the one- and two-year marks, respectively.36 On the other side of the em-
ployment equation, employers are motivated to terminate an employee who
experiences a work-limiting disability.37 There is simply little incentive in the
United States for employers to accommodate the employee as she rehabili-
tates or explores alternatives to her prior arrangement.
SSI discourages individuals from working principally because any piece-
meal earnings are quickly offset by reductions in benefits. For almost every
dollar earned, the government recoups 50 cents.38 Once earnings surpass
about $1,100 per month, the worker is no longer eligible for SSI benefits.39
And an eligible worker will be disqualified from receiving any benefits if she
earns just one dollar more. Even more critically, this would end her eligibil-
ity for Medicaid.40 The system therefore presents many people with a stark
choice: remain poor and continue receiving a steady stream of income and
access to health care41 or earn a nominally greater amount of money and
lose all governmental support and possibly endanger their lives.
The disability–employability bottleneck is substantiated by August 2014
statistics that reflect employment rates of 19.8% for people with disabilities
and 68.8% for people without disabilities.42 The current employment rate of
34. Id. at 4, 9–10.
35. See id. at 10 (noting empirical research that demonstrates that claimants who experi-
ence delays in the SSDI application process are less likely to return to work—even if they are
not ultimately awarded benefits). The process itself appears to inspire would-be claimants not
to work.
36. Howard A. Bose, Returning Injured Employees to Work, Prof. Safety, June 2008, at
63, 64, available at http://www.asse.org/professionalsafety/pastissues/053/06/BoseFeature_0608
.pdf.
37. Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis,
Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 705 (2014).
38. Soc. Sec. Admin., Working While Disabled—How We Can Help 12–13 (2014),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10095.pdf.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination,
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 889, 949.
41. Statistics from 2011 show that the average monthly payments to SSI and SSDI recipi-
ents were $501 per month and $1,068 per month, respectively. S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor & Pensions, 113th Cong., Unfinished Business: Making Employment of People
with Disabilities a National Priority 10 (2012) [hereinafter Unfinished Business].
“Both [amounts] are below the poverty level for a family of two.” Id.
42. Labor Force Statistics, Bureau Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cp-
satab6.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
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people with disabilities is historically low,43 and it can be partly attributed to
SSA’s failure to design programs that incentivize work.44 Quite simply, it is
often less stressful and more economically feasible for a disabled person to
procure benefits from the federal government than to work.45
Moreover, just as with the welfare-to-disability phenomenon described
above, there is institutional support in moving people from work to disabil-
ity benefits. Indeed, an entire industry of lawyer and nonlawyer advocates
now exists to help people with disabilities stop working and start receiving
benefits.46 The number of firms devoted to this kind of work has expanded
in recent years, and such firms only get paid if they secure benefits.47 Addi-
tionally, at the hearings where these decisions get made, there are no oppos-
ing lawyers to potentially resist the applicants’ claims.48 As a result, there are
strong economic incentives to help people receive disability benefits, which,
according to a recent U.S. Senate investigation, has led to many fraudulent
claims.49 As summed up by 60 Minutes, “There’s not much to lose, really. It
doesn’t cost you anything unless you win the appeal and the lawyers collect
from the federal government.”50 This puts a tremendous amount of pressure
on inundated administrative law judges to “sniff out misleading
applications.”51
43. See Autor, supra note 33, at 8. This is hard to measure exactly as different federal
agencies have, over time, used different definitions of “disability.” Unfinished Business,
supra note 41, at 6, 30; Stein et al., supra note 37, at 733. That said, the 1980 Census showed a
32% employment rate for working-age people with disabilities, as did 2012 statistics. Unfin-
ished Business, supra note 41, at 6–7.
44. See Autor, supra note 33, at 8 (“The simultaneous occurrence of these two trends—
declining employment among working-age people with disabilities and rising SSDI receipt—
underscores that the two key policy challenges of the SSDI program are two sides of the same
coin.”).
45. See id. at 10 (“It is difficult to overstate the role that the SSDI program currently
plays in discouraging the ongoing employment of non-elderly adults.”).
46. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 28.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See generally S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th
Cong., How Some Legal, Medical, and Judicial Professionals Abused Social Security
Disability Programs for the Country’s Most Vulnerable: A Case Study of the Conn
Law Firm (2013), available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&
File_id=0d1ad28a-fd8a-4aca-93bd-c7bf9543af36.
50. 60 Minutes: Disability, USA (CBS television broadcast Oct. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/disability-usa/.
51. Id. (“Marilyn Zahm and Randy Frye are two of the country’s 1,500 disability
judges. . . . They are each expected to read, hear, and decide up to 700 appeals a year to clear a
backlog of nearly a million cases. They say disability lawyers have flooded the system with cases
that shouldn’t be there.”); Joe Palazzolo, Binder Brothers Thrive in Strained U.S. Disability
System, Wall St. J. (Dec. 22, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/22/binder-brothers-
thrive-in-strained-u-s-disability-system/.
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The structure of SSDI and SSI prevents the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) from having its full effect since the statute depends upon peo-
ple with disabilities seeking and maintaining employment.52 While the ADA
has removed some barriers to work, not working has become more econom-
ically attractive due to administrative programs like SSDI and SSI.53 The
result is a deeply unsatisfying tension between the ADA and SSA’s programs,
a tension that stems from these programs’ different implicit views about the
relationship between disability and employability.54 Long-term success in in-
creasing the employment of people with disabilities will almost certainly re-
quire making the financial return on employment better than the return
from SSA’s cash-benefit scheme.55
The disability–employability bottleneck is similar to a gender-related
bottleneck that Fishkin identifies. He notes that many workplaces force peo-
ple (especially women) to choose between two critical forms of flourishing:
playing major roles in their families or having meaningful work lives
(pp. 224–28). People get steered onto one of two tracks: “ideal worker” jobs
or significant family caregiving.56 And the tracks do not cross much: ideal
worker jobs usually do not allow for much family caregiving, while signifi-
cant family caregiving is most compatible with “marginal or part-time
work” (pp. 225–27). Fishkin argues that, even if people are not completely
barred from either role, the inability to do both—since they are such cultur-
ally valued forms of flourishing—constitutes a serious bottleneck.57
We can construct a similar argument with respect to disability-specific
opportunities and benefit regimes. First, work is an important form of flour-
ishing, and for reasons independent of remuneration.58 Second, money is an
52. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, The Declining Work and Welfare
of People with Disabilities 102 (2011) (“While the ADA changed the law regarding the
treatment of people with disabilities, the safety net aimed at protecting their economic sta-
tus—SSDI and SSI—remained the same, leaving it out of sync with the goals and expectations
embodied in the ADA.”).
53. Id. at 3. It is worth noting that recipients are not getting rich from disability benefits
and that, for many, such aid is precisely what is needed for them to have shelter and their basic
needs fulfilled.
54. Stein et al., supra note 37, at 691–92 (“The definition of disability in the ADA . . . is
in tension with the Social Security Administration’s competing definition of disability as a
complete inability to work, a binary view of disability and employability that reaches back to
the Elizabethan Poor Laws.”).
55. See Burkhauser & Daly, supra note 52, at 106 (making this observation).
56. P. 225. Fishkin credits Joan Williams with establishing the “ideal worker” norm: a
worker who has no large nonwork time commitments and has access to domestic labor pro-
vided by someone else. P. 225 (citing Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and
Work Conflict and What to Do About It (2001)).
57. Pp. 4–5, 224. This example slots well into Fishkin’s general exposition of opportuni-
ties. There are many ways of flourishing, and people build lives out of combinations of them.
See generally pp. 1–23. When the opportunity structure forces some people to make a choice
between pursuing one of two important forms of flourishing—but not both—it creates a
potentially severe bottleneck in the sense that it occludes significant combinations of flourish-
ing. Pp. 4–5.
58. P. 220; see supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
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important instrumental good that supports human flourishing, and in fact a
steady flow of income is particularly important for certain forms of flourish-
ing, such as home ownership, raising children, or purchasing groceries
(pp. 158–59). An ideal system would support people with disabilities by ena-
bling them to obtain both meaningful work and a steady income. But disa-
bility laws instead force people to make a choice: They can “work,” a route
that is fraught with some difficulty, at least from the standpoint of the
ADA’s statistical weakness in supporting employment.59 Or they can switch
to a “disabled” legal status, thereby ensuring a steady paycheck. The choice is
especially complicated because of the ways in which the law incentivizes
both employers and disabled employees to forgo work and pursue adminis-
trative benefits. This bottleneck is intuitively problematic from the perspec-
tive of anyone who sees benefits in work for people with disabilities.
This bottleneck is also problematic from the viewpoint of human
agency. In Fishkin’s opportunity pluralism, agency matters; it is important
that people have different paths open to them—not just on a one-time basis
but throughout their lives (pp. 74–82). Yet the numbers highlighted above
show that virtually no one who is out of work for two years returns to the
workforce.60 Such statistics starkly illustrate that, after a certain amount of
time, America’s benefits scheme has the effect of putting up a “closed” sign
along the path of work, even as new technologies or new work structures
might enable disability-benefit recipients to return to work. (Here it is worth
recalling that a successful SSDI application can sometimes take several
years.61) These legal regimes lock in an unemployed status in ways that are
fundamentally at odds with opportunity pluralism in part because they in-
hibit people’s agency.
The incentives to pursue disability administrative benefits also have the
potential to create separate developmental bottlenecks. In other words, em-
ployment presents an opportunity to develop important abilities and skills
that are critical for subsequent opportunities; each potential employment
outcome may become an additional opportunity (p. 70). We might also view
these administrative policies as creating future qualification bottlenecks in
that failure to pursue employment now is likely to result in a person’s lack-
ing the necessary credentials to pursue a better position in the future.
Finally, we come to the normative question of whether the disabil-
ity–employability bottleneck should be addressed. As noted before, not all
59. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Em-
ployment for People with Disabilities?, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 527, 531 (2004) (book
review) (“People with disabilities are employed at vastly lower rates than are the nondisabled,
and a number of studies have shown that employment for people with disabilities declined
throughout the 1990s.” (footnote omitted)); Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23 Regulation, no. 1, 2000, at 21, 22–23 (documenting
how the ADA’s accommodation mandate has increased the cost of employing disabled workers
and thus has made such workers unattractive to businesses).
60. See supra text accompanying note 36.
61. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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bottlenecks require action; sometimes they are perfectly warranted. The pri-
mary questions require investigating whether the bottleneck is legitimate or
arbitrary and whether it is severe. If the bottleneck is both pervasive and
strict—even if it is legitimate—we should look for ways to ameliorate the
congestion it is causing within the opportunity structure (p. 168).
Here, the question of legitimacy is complicated. Some percentage of
people with disabilities is in fact unable to work, even when provided rea-
sonable accommodations. And it may be that, given the potential costs,
some employers do not want to hire people with disabilities.62 But there is
no necessary tension between disability and employability. And any
microinefficiencies felt by discrete employers may be offset in part by the
macroefficiencies that come from leveraging more talent within the poten-
tial workforce (pp. 181–82).
The severity of the bottleneck is less equivocal. The effects of disabil-
ity–employability funneling are pervasive because policies like welfare and
SSDI are well-known alternatives to work. The impact is also severe in that
people with disabilities are currently employed at some of the lowest levels
in recent history, and this trend has coincided with rising SSDI levels.63
Given both the appeal of opportunity pluralism and the value of work, we
ought carefully to consider how to make work more attractive and sustaina-
ble for people with disabilities.
There is one related and additional bottleneck, and this bottleneck ties
into the way that discrimination limits opportunities and affects the types of
jobs available to people with disabilities. Even when people with disabilities
find work, it is usually low-status or low-compensation work.64 The bottle-
neck, in this context, might be described in the following way: There is an
implicit bias that you must be able-bodied to work in all but the lower-
status jobs.65 Being perceived as disabled thus bars a person from most jobs,
especially those that are likely to be seen as most fulfilling.
Furthermore, law and policy do little to remedy this state of affairs. In
particular, state-level vocational training programs (which are often directed
toward people with disabilities) usually focus on low-level training.66 This
feature effectively ensures that people with disabilities, if they enter the
62. For example, some employers may self-insure for their health-insurance benefits, and
someone with a present significant disability may have ongoing costs to manage the ancillary
medical effects of the disability. Similarly, some accommodations undoubtedly have monetary
costs. But see Stein et al., supra note 37, at 753 (arguing that most accommodations are inex-
pensive or even costless).
63. See supra note 44.
64. See Heymann et al., supra note 19, at 5 (observing that workers with disabilities are
much more likely to be in part-time positions and earn lower wages than their comparable
colleagues without disabilities).
65. See generally Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
Smith eds., 2012).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26 (describing how state benefit programs
provide insufficient education and training).
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workforce, will have low status and earn low pay.67 Additionally, the combi-
nation of welfare, SSI, and SSDI stymies ambition by motivating people with
disabilities either not to work or to work just enough to retain their govern-
mental benefits.68 Many disabled workers with minimal skills or low motiva-
tion to invest in their own human capital have thus found themselves
pushed to the benefits rolls.
The principal thrust of disability policy remains providing money to
those who are deemed “unable to perform any substantial gainful activity.”69
It was in this context that, seventeen years ago, one labor-market scholar
questioned whether people with disabilities are truly expected to work.70 He
cautioned that, until policymakers are willing to risk the politics of social
engineering to reformulate a transfer-based disability policy into one that
expects disabled people to work, “a new and growing population of young
people with disabilities can look forward to a life of dependency.”71
The ultimate effect of these two bottlenecks is that people with disabili-
ties usually do not work.72 When they do, they cluster at the bottom levels of
companies, earning low wages with little or no prospect for upward mobil-
ity.73 If they later experience discrimination and seek recourse under the
ADA, their complaint may be addressed without any attention to possible
structural changes. After all, cases brought by lower-level employees are eas-
ier to settle and the employees themselves easier to replace.
III. Addressing the Disability–Employability Divide
This Part will now consider how best to address through policy reform
the bottlenecks described above. Leaving aside the historical rationales for a
binary view of disability and employability, such a framework obscures a
complete and accurate contemporary account of disability’s relationship to
working. Many people deemed “disabled” are in fact unable to work, but
many others who are similarly catalogued are able to work. Most people are
not simply one or the other—disabled or employable; indeed, the raison
67. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
68. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
69. Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 71, 72 (1997); see also Substantial Gainful Activity, supra
note 30.
70. See generally Burkhauser, supra note 69.
71. Id. at 72.
72. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing the current employment
rate of people with disabilities, which is just above 19%). The bottlenecks identified in this
Review are not the only causes of this effect, but it is hard to overestimate the role that SSDI
plays in discouraging the employment of people with disabilities. Autor, supra note 33, at 10.
73. See Lauren Lindstrom & Laurie Gutmann Kahn, Career Advancement for Young
Adults with Disabilities, in Disability and Equity at Work, supra note 19, at 213, 216–18
(observing that career advancement for people with disabilities is burdened both by patterns
of discrimination and by lack of access to “specific skill training” or necessary education);
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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d’être for Title I of the ADA is that the vast majority of people with disabili-
ties are both disabled and able (with or without reasonable accommodation)
to work.74 The definition of “disability” used by SSA in administering SSI
and SSDI benefits was written in 1956, “a time when our country’s expecta-
tions about people with disabilities and the general level of accessibility were
very different than they are today.”75 Today’s economy contrasts starkly with
economies from centuries ago, when having a disability and working were
less compatible. Most jobs today are not predicated on physically strenuous
activities, and, for those that are, accommodations are often available to help
people with physical disabilities remain active in the labor force.76 Similarly,
there are accommodations today that did not exist in earlier generations—
such as telecommuting—which may allow people who have mental disabili-
ties to keep working.77 Yet tensions between disability and employability per-
sist, and in fact they may help explain the one-sided results of the Supreme
Court’s ADA jurisprudence.78 Ameliorating bottlenecks will thus require
making it more attractive to work—rather than not work—and perhaps
combining work with limited receipt of benefits. It is also critical to enable
people with disabilities to advance beyond entry-level positions.
One structural answer to these disability bottlenecks is creating inven-
tive “work-first” approaches to disability benefits. Several economists and
public leaders have recently observed that U.S. disability policy would bene-
fit from financial and institutional incentives that reward work.79 One exam-
ple, focused on employees, would involve designing a disabled-worker tax
credit modeled on the Earned Income Tax Credit.80 This kind of credit could
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012) (observing that “physical or mental disabilities in
no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society,” including
through work); id. § 12112(b)(5) (requiring employers to reasonably accommodate people
with disabilities).
75. Unfinished Business, supra note 41, at 3.
76. Autor, supra note 33, at 4–5.
77. Attitudes may also explain a lot on this score. As social attitudes about individuals
with mental disabilities have gradually changed and as conditions in the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders have proliferated, there is less of a proclivity to institutional-
ize or demonize every mental condition.
78. Stein et al., supra note 37, at 716 (“[T]he inability of the Court to resolve the tension
between work capability and disability status remains a critical problem.”); id. (“No ADA
employment-discrimination suit brought before the Supreme Court (prior to the ADAAA)
achieved victory, and every case involved persons with impairments who were both work
capable and seeking to retain their employment.”).
79. Unfinished Business, supra note 41, at 23–30; Burkhauser & Daly, supra note 52,
at 1–5, 105–06. See generally Burkhauser, supra note 69.
80. See Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Wittenburg, How Current Disability Transfer
Policies Discourage Work: Analysis from the 1990 SIPP, 7 J. Vocational Rehabilitation 9,
21–22 (1996) (proposing a disabled-worker tax credit); Weber, supra note 40, at 947 (advocat-
ing the same). Professor Burkhauser and Mary C. Daly cite the 1996 federal welfare reform, in
which single mothers were given an earned income tax credit, as support for this approach.
Burkhauser & Daly, supra note 52, at 4–5, 21–34.
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help overcome SSI’s tendency to discourage work by providing a tax credit
for people with disabilities who work.81
Another work-first reform, this one focused on employers, would be to
require companies fully to fund several years of disability benefits for their
workers who take disability and to pay a disability tax based on the number
of workers who transition from their employment onto long-term disability
insurance.82 Notably, SSDI is financed through a flat-rate payroll tax rather
than experience rated (the way that state unemployment and workers’ com-
pensation programs are financed); this means that employers face no in-
creased costs if workers transition to SSDI benefits.83 If an employee with a
work-limiting impairment exits the workforce, the federal government pays
for all of the SSDI benefits, simultaneously freeing the employer from paying
any costs associated with rehabilitation and accommodation.84 Accordingly,
employers are in no way incentivized to direct money toward rehabilitation
or accommodation, and they may even actively shepherd disabled employees
onto the SSDI rolls.85 If U.S. employers were forced to bear the costs associ-
ated with their employees leaving work to pursue disability benefits—
through experience rating or funding several years of benefits—these em-
ployers would naturally become more motivated to make investments in ac-
commodation and rehabilitation that could help their employees keep
working.86
But making work more attractive than benefits may require even greater
changes to SSA’s programs, which are largely predicated on a disabil-
ity–employability divide. Under the current model, applicants must go
through a long process of showing that they cannot work before they are
allowed to use SSA’s work-focused support mechanisms.87 But by then it is
too late. Intervening earlier with employment-support services, even as ap-
plications are pending, would help reintegrate workers into the labor force.88
It would also help stem the inertia of disabled individuals who are not cur-
rently working—inertia that quickly results in their permanent exit from the
workforce.89
81. Weber, supra note 40, at 947–48.
82. A similar policy exists in the Netherlands and has been successful in motivating em-
ployers to accommodate disabled workers. See Burkhauser & Daly, supra note 52, at 68–84
(discussing lessons for the United States from Dutch disability policy reforms).
83. Id. at 60, 62.
84. Id. at 61, 109.
85. Id. at 61.
86. Id. at 109 (“[U]sing experience rating to determine a firm’s per-worker tax rate for
SSDI would more directly link the costs to the firm of one of its workers moving onto the
SSDI program, and thereby require an employer to balance the full economic costs and bene-
fits of providing accommodation and rehabilitation versus assisting a worker onto the SSDI
program following a health shock.”).
87. Id. at 105.
88. See id. at 105–07.
89. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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A second structural answer would be to require, in certain contexts and
by federal mandate, a specific level of employment of people with disabili-
ties. The federal government for decades has had its own internal mandate
for hiring people with disabilities.90 Similarly, section 503 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 prohibits federal contractors and subcontractors from dis-
criminating against people with disabilities and requires such employers to
take affirmative action to recruit, hire, promote, and retain people with disa-
bilities.91 While section 503 has not been vigorously enforced,92 there has
been recent progress. In March 2014, new Department of Labor regulations
went into effect that strengthened the affirmative action provisions of the
regulations implementing section 503.93 The new regulations are more
proactive and set an explicit 7% goal for hiring individuals with disabili-
ties.94 While there may be limits to the efficacy of a quota system for the
private sector (such as exists in Germany and Japan), this type of govern-
ment-based affirmative action may be useful to increase the employment of
people with disabilities.95
A third structural answer would be ameliorating disability bottlenecks
to expand the availability of accommodations in the workplace. The ADA
provides a right to workplace accommodations for people with disabilities as
long as the accommodations are reasonable and do not pose an undue hard-
ship to the employer.96 But there have been long-standing challenges to se-
curing such accommodations,97 and those challenges may become even
more pronounced in the wake of the 2008 amendments to the ADA.98 The
90. See, e.g., Disability Employment, Off. Personnel Mgmt., http://www.opm.gov/pol-
icy-data-oversight/disability-employment (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); Increasing Disability Em-
ployment in the Federal Government, Off. Disability Emp. Pol’y, http://www.dol.gov/odep/
federal-hire/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
91. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 503, 87 Stat. 355, 393 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 793 (2012)).
92. Unfinished Business, supra note 41, at 14 (“To the extent that disability has come
up in OFCCP audits historically, it has never received the same level of data-driven scrutiny
and attention that [sex and race] have received.”).
93. New Regulations: Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, Office of Fed. Contract
Compliance Programs, www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2014) (summarizing the new regulations implementing section 503).
94. Id.
95. See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58
Hastings L.J. 1203, 1231–33 (2007) (noting problems and benefits of quota regimes for peo-
ple with disabilities).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (prohibiting disability employment discrimination
against a qualified individual); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include an
employer’s failure to make reasonable accommodations unless it can prove undue hardship).
97. Stein et al., supra note 37, at 713–15.
98. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2027, 2068 (2013) (“[P]laintiff-friendly outcomes
engineered by the ADAAA with respect to disability status are being partially offset by more
employer-friendly outcomes with respect to qualified status.”); Stein et al., supra note 37, at
715 (“Keeping the bar relatively high for securing an accommodation was part of the political
compromise necessary to achieve the [amendment’s] passage.”).
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most fundamental challenge has been the requirement that an individual
prove her impairment is severe enough to qualify for an accommodation
under the ADA while at the same time showing she is not so impaired that
she is unqualified for the job in question.99 Framed in slightly different
terms, plaintiffs must show that they are “disabled enough” to seek a reason-
able accommodation but not “too disabled” to be qualified for the job.100 In
a recent article, we argue that lowering the bar to receiving accommodations
is at least part of the solution to enable disabled workers to start working
and keep working.101 We argue in particular for extending an ADA-like rea-
sonable-accommodation mandate to all individuals who would be able to
work if given such an accommodation.102 In other words, accommodations
should be detached from disability status, resulting in a right to reasonable
accommodation that flows not from group affiliation but from the individ-
ual need for accommodation.103 Expanding accommodations in this way
could, over time, positively impact workplace norms and encourage all
workers (and especially disabled workers) to make greater investments in
their own productivity.104
To return to Fishkin’s opportunity nomenclature, the appeal of these
proposals is that they help people with disabilities get both through and
around disability bottlenecks. They do so by helping people with disabilities
see work as an economically superior option to benefits and, more generally,
by incentivizing people with disabilities to give up benefits in order to work.
The employer-subsidization and accommodation proposals would help peo-
ple with disabilities secure and sustain employment by inspiring and man-
dating, respectively, employers to structure their workplaces in ways that
accommodate more disabled workers. These prescriptions help people move
more fluidly between disability and employability statuses and break down
the distinction by facilitating the employment of people who are both dis-
abled and employable.
Our proposal to universalize accommodations is perfectly consonant
with Fishkin’s focus on creating more opportunities for all human flourish-
ing—and not merely relying on conventional, group-based claims to do
so.105 But some of our other proposals are in tension with Fishkin’s princi-
ples. For example, requiring a certain level of employment for people with
disabilities ostensibly conflicts with Fishkin’s claim that we should focus on
99. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrench-
ment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 Ind. L.J. 181 (2008).
100. Id. at 209–25 (analyzing this tension).
101. See generally Stein et al., supra note 37.
102. Id. at 690–95.
103. Id. at 737–43.
104. Id. at 744–55.
105. P. 245 (“Instead of asking whether someone is really a member of a group in order to
determine whether the law protects them, we need only ask whether a person’s opportunities
are being constrained by the relevant bottleneck—discrimination of the prohibited kind.”); see
also p. 252 (“The law of reasonable accommodation is a similarly powerful tool in the anti-
bottleneck toolkit.”).
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ameliorating the bottleneck itself instead of merely redistributing opportuni-
ties among groups (pp. 250–53). But as Fishkin also notes, if the bottleneck
turns on group membership, the solution may also need to turn on group
membership (as do a disabled-worker tax credit and requiring employers to
subsidize disability benefits) (p. 251).
Fishkin’s focus on making opportunities more available to everyone is
consistent with integrating more fully people with disabilities into our soci-
ety. This emphasis underscores our proposal to reimagine and broaden the
role of accommodations in the workplace.106 Instead of channeling opportu-
nities to one particular group (those legally sanctioned under the ADA as
“disabled”), our proposal would accommodate a wider range of individuals
(those who are not “disabled” but nonetheless need workplace accommoda-
tions). In this way, our proposal would reshape a “corner of the opportunity
structure” (p. 22).
Fishkin’s observations about human development also advance the so-
cial model of disability, in which disability is seen not as fundamentally
physiological but rather as socially constructed.107 In particular, Fishkin’s
work summarizes and powerfully illustrates how physiology and society are
not separate causal inputs but rather iteratively constitute “disablement”—
Professor Oliver’s term for disability’s social construction.108 People are not
born disabled, but the interaction between a person’s physiology and envi-
ronment may result in a disabling reality. Moreover, a person’s environment
may fundamentally shape that person’s physiology, which is evident in the
way that eye surgery, hearing aids, or wheelchairs may “break the link be-
tween certain traits and particular incapacities” (pp. 105–06). The emergent
understanding is that disability and ability are not essences; they are social
conditions that are contingent upon and constituted by a person’s
environment.109
106. See generally Stein et al., supra note 37.
107. Michael Oliver is seen as the architect of this model and famously explained that
disability was a social problem constituted by “all the things that impose restrictions on dis-
abled people; ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inacces-
sible public buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education to excluding
work arrangements.” Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability 33 (1st ed., St. Martin’s
Press 1996). These observations were in contrast to the traditional view of disability as located
squarely within the individual and as redressable only by medical institutions. Id. at 30–42. For
more on the social model of disability and how disabled persons may be rightly seen as having
no essential differences, see generally Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 347, 373–74 (2011) (arguing through various concrete examples that disability is
socially constructed).
108. See Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement 11 (1990) (distinguishing be-
tween impairment and disablement).
109. See p. 105 (“[W]e need to think in terms of a social model of ability. No matter what
the capacity . . . it necessarily arises out of some interaction between a person and her society
or environment.”).
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Conclusion
It is worth revisiting what is at stake in the foregoing discussion for
people with disabilities. In the context of bottlenecks, the wide swath of
opportunity that lies on the other side is not simply the remuneration that
work provides. There are also less tangible benefits, such as the dignitary
interest of work, creation of self-esteem, breakdown of stigma, social inclu-
sion, and being perceived as a financially productive and contributing mem-
ber of society.110 As Fishkin writes in his book, “Jobs are many things at
once: a large part of many people’s identities, an engine of equality or ine-
quality, a site of freedom or dependency” (p. 220). For people with disabili-
ties, work can thus be critical to the evolution of their identity, it can be a
site of equitable treatment and integration into society, and it can result in
greater independence. These are all values that are at the heart of disability
rights and the ADA itself.
110. See supra text accompanying note 20.
